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Abstract
This paper constructs a simple Malthusian model to explain per capita income dierences in
the Malthusian era by focusing on regional variations in the expansion of the commercial sector.
This paper shows that a larger productivity improvement in the skilled intensive commercial sector
relative to the improvement in the unskilled intensive agricultural sector causes a higher per capita
income in the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium by enhancing the child quantity-quality transition.
From the late Middle Ages, Northwestern Europe (Britain and the Netherlands) was characterized
by dramatic growth of both the commercial sector and urbanization, high literacy rates, and a low-
pressure demographic regime, and thus, these regions developed very dierently from the rest of
Europe. Our results are somewhat consistent with the relevant experiences of Northwestern Europe
in the preindustrial era.
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1 Introduction
In the Malthusian era, which includes much of human history, the positive relationship between popu-
lation growth and per capita income led to stagnant living standards. Higher per capita income causes
more births, fewer deaths and a larger population. However, because of diminishing returns to labor in
production, a higher population gradually osets any improvement in the income level, which forces it
back to the original level of stagnant living standards. The entire world economy had been under this
Malthusian regime until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Western Europe escaped from
the Malthusian Epoch and transitioned to the Post-Malthusian regime (Galor, 2005; Clark, 2007; Galor,
2011).
However, recent historical studies show that Malthusian equilibrium does not imply that per capita
income must necessarily be at minimum subsistence levels. For example, according to Allen et al.
(2011), even in the mid seventeenth century (a time when England's population was constant) the wage
of unskilled laborers in England was well above the biological minimum food equivalent of about 1500 cal
a day. One implication of this fact is that living standards across regions were not necessarily homogenous
even in the Malthusian era. In particular, a number of recent studies have pointed to the emergence of
Northwestern Europe (England and the Netherlands) as a high wage/per capita income economy during
the early modern period, which is between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries; indeed, there was
dramatic growth of commercialization and urbanization as this region displaced the Iberian powers in
long-distance trade to Asia and the New World (van Zanden, 1999; Allen, 2001; Broadberry and Gupta,
2006). At the same time, compared with the rest of Europe, Northwestern Europe generated an economy
with a higher level of literacy, higher skill formation and a lower-pressure demographic regime (Wrigley
et al., 1997; De Moor and van Zanden, 2010; Allen, 2011). Therefore, several historians and economists
argue that this little divergence within Europe leads to the great divergence between Europe and Asia
in the early 19th century (Broadberry and Gupta, 2006, 2007, Voigtlander and Voth, 2006).
Inspired by these historical ndings, in this paper, we construct a simple Malthusian model in ac-
cordance with Ashraf and Galor (2011) to identify the necessary factors to explain regional per capita
income dierences in the preindustrial era. This paper extends the one-sector Malthusian model of
Ashraf and Galor (2011) by introducing two production sectors: the skilled intensive commercial sector
and the unskilled intensive agricultural sector. In addition, we explicitly consider parental trade-os
between the number and quality of children. We argue that the larger productivity improvement in the
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skilled intensive commercial sector relative to the improvement in the unskilled intensive agricultural
sector increases the demand for skilled labor with basic literacy, numeracy and knowledge of market
transactions, enhances the child quantity-quality transition, and induces the emergence of an economy
that is characterized by high per capita income, a high literacy rate and a low-pressure demographic
regime. The regional variations in the expansion of the commercial sector help to explain regional per
capita income dierences in the Malthusian World. Although we develop a simple, tractable model to
capture the general features of a Malthusian equilibrium, our model may help to explain historically
observed facts of Northwestern Europe in the preindustrial era.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 contains a literature review, section 3 presents the basic
setup of our Malthusian model, and section 4 analyses the dynamic properties of the model and examines
both the short-run and the long-run eects of sectoral dierences in productivity improvement. Then,
section 5 provides a historical narrative in which increasing demand for skilled labor due to growing com-
mercialization induced the child quantity-quality transition, which led to the emergence of Northwestern
Europe as the leading economy; it was characterized by high per capita income, a high literacy rate and
a low-pressure demographic regime. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As suggested by Sharp et al. (2011) and others, the determinants of per capita income in a Malthusian
equilibrium are captured by the simple diagrammatic representation of Figure 1. Changes in the per
capita income yt have a double eect on population growth. Indeed, lower per capita income leads to later
marriage and fewer births (i.e., preventive checks), which explains the upward-sloping birth schedule bt
in Figure 1. However, lower per capita income also leads to poor nutrition and a higher death rate (i.e.,
positive checks), which explains the downward-sloping death schedule dt in Figure 1. The intersection
of the birth and death schedules E0 determines the equilibrium per capita income y

0 , which is dened
as the level of per capita income at which the population level remains constant over time. 1 Hence, the
factors that potentially aect the position of the birth and/or death schedules can explain regional per
capita income dierences in the Malthusian era, which is evident from Figure1.
In this paper, we focus on the factors that aect the position of the birth schedules and argue that a
larger productivity improvement in the skilled intensive commercial sector relative to the improvement
1When yt > y0 , the birth rate momentarily exceeds the death rate, and thus, the population starts to increase;
furthermore, with diminishing returns to labor in production, this pattern gradually decreases the level of per capita
income. Similarly, when yt < y0 , the death rate exceeds the birth rate, the population begins to shrink, and the level of
per capita income gradually rises.
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in the unskilled intensive agricultural sector induces downward shifts of the birth schedule by enhancing
the child quantity-quality transition, which leads to the higher equilibrium per capita income that is
depicted in Figure 1. Furthermore, we show that a proportional productivity improvement in both the
commercial sector and the agricultural sector has no eect on the birth and death schedules, and thus,
this improvement has no eect on the equilibrium per capita income.
This paper shares many research interests with recent literature that attempts to predict the determi-
nants of per capita income in a Malthusian equilibrium (e.g., Voigtlander and Voth, 2009, 2010a, 2010b,
Ashraf and Galor, 2011, Sharp et al., 2011, and Vollrath, 2011). In particular, Voigtlander and Voth
(2010b), Sharp et al. (2011) and Vollrath (2011) are closely related to our research because they also
focus on the factors that aect the position of the birth schedule in the preindustrial era. Voigtlander and
Voth (2010b) argue that the positive shock to incomes after the Black Death increased the demand for
pastoral products (e.g., meat, cheese and wool) in Europe, which led to the shift of agricultural produc-
tion from crops to livestock. This positive demand shock for pastoral products expanded the employment
opportunities of unmarried woman as servants, increased their opportunity costs of childrearing, laid the
foundations for the European Marriage Pattern that was characterized by a high average age of marriage
and a high female celibacy rate, and induced the downward shift of the birth schedule in Europe. Fur-
thermore, Sharp et al. (2011) and Vollrath (2011) argue that a shift in the price of foods, and therefore,
of children relative to the price of other goods plays a critical role in determining the position of the
birth schedule. Sharp et al. (2011) state that higher industrial productivity increased the relative price
of food, increased the costs of raising children, and induced a downward shift of the birth schedule.
Instead, Vollrath (2011) states that the lower labor intensity of wheat production in Europe relative to
rice production in Asia decreased the share of labor in agriculture, increased the relative price of food,
increased the costs of raising children, and induced the downward shift of the birth schedule in Europe.
As depicted in Figure 1, these downward shifts of the birth schedule in Europe led to a higher per capita
income in Europe relative to the corresponding income in Asia in the preindustrial era.
In contrast, Clark (2007) and Voigtlander and Voth (2010a) focus on the factors that aect the
position of the death schedule in the preindustrial era. For example, Voigtlander and Voth (2010a)
argue that European wars and the sharp rise in European urbanization enhanced the spread of infectious
diseases, raised European mortality, and induced the upward shift of the death schedule in Europe.
Hence, as inferred from Figure 1, this upward shift in the European death schedule led to the higher per
capita income in Europe relative to the corresponding income in Asia in the preindustrial era.
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These existing Malthusian models show several very convincing factors that explain regional per
capita income dierences in the preindustrial era. However, none of these studies have examined how
the expansion of the commercial sector and the corresponding child quality-quantity transition aect per
capita income in the Malthusian equilibrium. Therefore, this paper oers a complementary approach to
understanding per capita income variations across the Malthusian World.
Moreover, this paper is also closely related to Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008). Galor and Mount-
ford (2006, 2008) argue that the expansion of international trade in the second phase of the industrial
revolution enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the production of industrial, skilled
intensive goods. The associated rise in the demand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment
in the quality of the population, which has expedited a demographic transition, stimulated technological
progress and further enhanced the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production
of skilled intensive goods. In contrast, in non-industrial economies, international trade has generated
an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive, non-industrial goods. The absence
of a signicant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in the quality of
the population and the gains from trade have been utilized primarily to further increase the size of the
population rather than increase the income of the existing population. Therefore, the historical patterns
of international trade have reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage and generated a great
divergence in income per capita across countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Our paper's stress on the interactions between commercial development and the demographic tran-
sition is in accordance with the convincing arguments of Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008). However,
dierently from Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008), this paper employs a simple Malthusian model in
accordance with Ashraf and Galor (2011), and we focus our analysis on the Malthusian equilibrium in the
preindustrial era. In this sense, this paper complements Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008) by explicitly
considering the eect of interactions between the commercial sector's development and the demographic
transition on per capita income in the Malthusian World. 2
2Furthermore, a link between commercialization and economic growth is stressed by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and
Broadberry et al. (2012). Acemoglu et al. (2005) focus on the impact of Atlantic trade on institutions: growing trade
strengthens the position of merchants in Northwestern Europe and enables them to impose eective constraints on the
government's executive power; hence, growing trade contributes to the development of less extractive institutions. In
addition, Broadberry et al. (2012) focus on the role of commercialization in raising wages as impersonal labor market
transactions replace personalized customary relations. In the presence of an aggregate capital externality, the resulting
shift in relative factor prices leads to higher capital intensity in the production technology, which results in a faster rate of
technological progress.
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3 The model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over innite discrete
time. In every period t, a single homogenous good is produced by two sectors: the unskilled-labor-
intensive agricultural sector and the skilled-labor-intensive commercial sector.
3.1 Production in the Agricultural and Commercial Sectors
In this paper, the agricultural sector is denoted by A, the commercial sector is denoted by C, the output
produced in the agricultural sector in period t is denoted by YA;t, and the output produced in the
commercial sector in period t is denoted by YC;t. The sectoral production technology is constant returns
to scale using sector-specic xed factors of production (e.g., the land and natural environments) and
labor. Following Cervellati and Sunde (2005), for the sake of simplicity we restrict our attention to the
extreme case in which every sector uses only one type of labor; that is, whereas the agricultural sector
only employs unskilled labor, the commercial sector only employs skilled labor.
Then, the aggregate output in period t, or Yt, is given by
Yt = YA;t + YC;t;
= 
AZ
1 
A L

u;t +
CZ
1 
C L

s;t;
= 
AL

u;t +
CL

s;t;
(1)
where  2 (0; 1).3 
i and Zi denote the total factor productivity and sector-specic xed factors of
production in sector i 2 fA;Cg, and furthermore, Lu;t and Ls;t denote the aggregate levels of unskilled
and skilled labor that are supplied in period t. Sector-specic xed factors of production in the agri-
cultural sector, which are denoted ZA, include such factors as rural arable land and pasture, whereas
sector-specic xed factors of production in the commercial sector, which are denoted ZC , include urban
commercial land and fuel from woodland. To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume that both ZA
and ZC are normalized to unity (i.e., we assume that Zi = 1 for all i 2 fA;Cg). In the preindustrial
economy, as stressed by Wringley (1900), the land was almost the exclusive source not only of food but
also of the great bulk of the raw material and energy used in the non-agricultural sector. Nearly all of
the motive power that drove production was conditioned by the universal dependence on organic sources,
i.e., human and animal muscle supplemented by wind and water, where heat was provided by burning
wood or charcoal (i.e., an organic economy). As Wrigley (1900) argues, \An organic economy, however
3Dierent productivity parameters A and C in the two sectors would not alter our qualitative results, but this
extension would make it impossible to obtain a closed-form analytical solution.
6
advanced, was subject to negative feedback in the sense that the very process of growth set in train
changes that made further growth additionally dicult because of the operations of declining marginal
returns in production from the land." In this paper, to capture the essence of the organic economy in a
simple way, we consider the situation where diminishing returns to labor in production prevail not only
in the agricultural sector but also in the commercial sector due to sector-specic xed factors.
Only workers with basic literacy, numeracy and knowledge of market transactions can work as skilled
workers in the commercial sector. One of the distinctive features of the commercial sector is its depen-
dency on the anonymous market or reliance on anonymous, impersonal relations rather than personalized
customary relations. As formulated by Kumar and Matsusaka (2009), in general there are two forms of
human/social capital that can be used to enforce contracts: local capital and market capital. Local cap-
ital takes the form of kinship, networks, patron-client relations, and in-depth knowledge about trading
partners, which encompasses a variety of arrangements that are often labeled social capital. In contrast,
market capital takes the form of knowledge about how to use third-party enforcement institutions such as
courts, auditors, standardized accounting procedures, credit ratings, and commercial law. In this paper,
we assume that basic literacy and numeracy are prerequisite for acquiring market capital and working
in the commercial sector. Although this specication is clearly restrictive, it greatly eases the following
analysis and captures one of the signicant elements of the commercial sector.
Let ws;t denote the wage of skilled workers in the commercial sector, and let wu;t denote the wage
of unskilled workers in the agricultural sector. Assuming perfectly competitive labor markets, prot
maximization in the nal good sector is consistent with the following conditions in the labor market:
ws;t = 
C(Ls;t)
 1; (2)
wu;t = 
A(Lu;t)
 1: (3)
Furthermore, the sum of the prots of each sector (the sum of the return on each sector's xed specic
factors) is given by
t = (1  )
ALu;t + (1  )
CLs;t: (4)
Because this paper does not address landholding inequality issues, for simplicity we assume that all adult
individuals hold equal amounts of each sector's specic xed factors and share equally the sum of the
prots of each sector.4 Later, we explain this point briey.
4This assumption does not alter our qualitative results.
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3.2 Sector-biased productivity improvements
This paper addresses how sectoral dierences in productivity improvement aect equilibrium outcomes.
To examine this issue systematically, following Galor and Mountford (2008) and Weisdorf (2006) we
assume that each sector's level of productivity, which is denoted 
i for i 2 fA;Cg, is aected by the
overall level of technology 
. However, the degree to which each sector's level of productivity 
i is
aected by the overall level of technology 
 is not necessary the same. More specically, we suppose
that

i = i

i ; i 2 (0; 1); i > 0; i 2 fA;Cg (5)
where i expresses the degree to which each sector's level of productivity 
i is aected by the overall
level of technology 
. Under the specication in (5), the relation 
C
A =
C
A

(C A) holds. Therefore,
if C > A, the per-unit increase in the overall level of technology 
 leads to a larger productivity
improvement in the commercial sector relative to the improvement in the agricultural sector. Similarly,
if C < A, the per-unit increase in the overall level of technology 
 leads to a smaller productivity
improvement in the commercial sector relative to the improvement in the agricultural sector. Moreover,
if C = A, then the per-unit increase in the overall level of technology 
 leads to proportionate
productivity improvements in both the commercial sector and the agricultural sector. In this sense,
when C > A, the higher overall level of technology 
 generates commercial-sector-biased productivity
improvement; when C < A, 
 generates agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement; lastly,
when C = A, 
 generates sector-neutral productivity improvement. In the following analysis, we
rigorously examine the eect of the overall level of technology 
 on the equilibrium outcomes in each of
the following cases: C > A, C < A and C = A.
3.3 Households
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who live for two periods, childhood
and adulthood. Children receive education, and adults can either be skilled or unskilled; their skill
level depends on their education during their childhood. In the rst period of life (childhood), people
are supported and educated by their parents. Skilled ospring require larger investments from their
parents to acquire basic literacy, numeracy and market capital. In the second period of life, adults are
endowed with one unit of time of either skilled labor, which we denote s, or unskilled labor, which we
denote u. Furthermore, adults inherit equal amounts of each sector-specic factor from their parents. In
addition, adults inelastically supply their labor and receive wages as well as a rate of return from equally
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shared sector-specic factors, and furthermore, they decide on their consumption and the number and
education of their children. In each period t, there is a continuum of adults of each type: Nu;t is a
measure of unskilled adults and Ns;t is a measure of skilled adults. The total adult population Nt
satises Nt = Nu;t +Ns;t.
As in Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008), individuals' preferences are dened over consumption and
both the number and the potential wage income of their ospring. The preferences of a type i, i = u; s,
of generation t (i.e., an individual who is born in period t-1) are represented by the utility function
Ui;t = (1  )lnci;t + ln[wu;t+1(nui;t+1) + ws;t+1(nsi;t+1)];  2 (0; 1); (6)
where ci;t is consumption during adulthood, n
u
i;t+1 is the number of ospring who are trained to be
unskilled workers, nsi;t+1 is the number of ospring who are trained to be skilled workers, and wu;t+1
and ws;t+1 are the wages paid to unskilled and skilled ospring in period t+ 1, respectively. We assume
that whereas skilled adults can perform both skilled work and unskilled work, unskilled adults can only
do unskilled work. Under this assumption, the skilled wage in the commercial sector cannot fall below
the unskilled wage in the agricultural sector (i.e., ws;t  wu;t).
Individuals inherit equal amounts of each sector-specic factor from their parents, inelastically supply
their labor, and generate an income Ii;t,
Ii;t = wi;t +
t
Nt
; i = u; s: (7)
This income is composed of wage income wi;t and income from equally shared sector-specic factor
holdings tNt . We denote the cost required to bring up a skilled ospring as
1
s and the cost required to
bring up an unskilled ospring as 1u , where 0 < 
s < u. Thus, the budget constraint of a type i of
generation t, i = u; s, is
ci;t +
1
u
nui;t+1 +
1
 s
nsi;t+1 = Ii;t; i = u; s: (8)
Given that s < u, skilled ospring are more expensive than unskilled ospring because parents have to
send children to school or hire tutors to learn basic reading, writing, arithmetic skills, accounting, law, and
other skills that comprise market capital. It is natural to assume that market capital is more expensive
to acquire than local capital, which unskilled workers more intensively acquire. Whereas investment in
market capital typically requires formal schooling with both a direct cost (tuition, books, etc.) and an
indirect cost (because children are unable to work), local capital can be accumulated passively during
time spent at home, possibly in household production.5
5For example, Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) state that local capital can be created through marriage alliances (for
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Type i individuals of generation t choose cit, n
u
i;t+1 and n
s
i;t+1 to maximize (6) subject to (7) and
(8). An alternative way of formulating this problem is to imagine type i individuals as choosing a total
education cost Ei;t that they spend on raising ospring, that is, Ei;t  1unui;t+1 + 1snsi;t+1 and the
fraction fi;t+1 of this cost is what they spend on skilled ospring. Then, the number of ospring is given
by nsi;t+1 = 
sfi;t+1Ei;t and n
u
i;t+1 = 
ufi;t+1Ei;t. In this equivalent formulation, type i individuals of
generation t choose Eit and fi;t+1 2 [0; 1] to maximize
Ui;t = (1  )ln(Ii;t Ei;t)+ ln[wu;t+1(u)(1  fi;t+1) +ws;t+1(s)fi;t+1] + lnEi;t; i = u; s: (9)
Then, the optimal consumption ci;t, the expenditure for children Ei;t, the expenditure share for skilled
ospring fi;t+1, the number of skilled ospring n
s
i;t+1, the number of unskilled ospring n
u
i;t+1 and the
total number of ospring per household ni;t+1, are as follows:
ci;t =
1  
1   +  Ii;t; i = u; s; (10)
Ei;t =

1   +  Ii;t; i = u; s; (11)
fi;t+1 = ft+1 =
!
1
1 
t+1 (
s
u )

1 
1 + !
1
1 
t+1 (
s
u )

1 
 f(!t+1); i = u; s; (12)
nui;t+1 = 
u(1  ft+1)Ei;t; i = u; s; (13)
nsi;t+1 = 
sft+1Ei;t; i = u; s; (14)
ni;t+1 = n
u
i;t+1 + n
s
i;t+1 = [
u(1  ft+1) + sft+1]Ei;t; i = u; s; (15)
where !t+1  ws;t+1wu;t+1 . Here, !t+1 denotes the skilled premium in period t + 1 or wage dierentials
between the commercial sector and the agricultural sector in period t + 1. From (12), the expenditure
share for skilled ospring becomes constant across dierent skill-type parents because it only depends
on market variables such as s, u and !t+1. In addition, the skill premium in period t + 1, which we
denote !t+1, positively aects the expenditure share for skilled ospring in period t, or ft+1. To stress
this fact, we describe ft+1 as f(!t+1), which satises the following properties:
@ft
@!t+1
= ft+1(1 ft+1)(1 )!t+1 > 0,
lim!t+1!1 f(!t+1) =
( 
s
u )

1 
1+( 
s
u )

1 
 f and lim!t+1!1 f(!t+1) = 1. Thus, from equations (13) to (15)
and because  s < u, the higher skill premium in period t+1, which we denote !t+1, ceteris paribus leads
to a higher share of skilled ospring and a lower total number of children per household ni;t+1. Therefore,
the higher expected skill premium in period t+1 or the wage dierentials between the commercial sector
example, in parts of rural India it was a longstanding custom for a man to marry his niece) and giving gifts (which
anthropological studies indicate is an important expenditure in many local economies).
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and the rural agricultural sector in period t+ 1 (or !t+1) leads to a child quantity-quality transition in
period t.
Moreover, because ws;t  wu;t, from (11) and (15) we can see that the relation ns;t+1  nu;t+1 holds
due to Is;t  Iu;t. This result indicates that skilled parents have larger numbers of (surviving) ospring
than unskilled parents. This theoretical result is consistent with Clark's (2007) nding in preindustrial
England that the rich (high status and high-income occupations) had more surviving children than the
poor (low status and low-income occupations). Allen (2008) also points out that reproductive success
among the rich can be observed not only in England, but also in countries such as South Germany,
Austria, France, Sweden, Switzerland, and China.
As in Foreman-Peck (2011), we can interpret the above household decision problem as the joint
fertility and marriage decision problem of unmarried couples. In the absence of eective contraception
and given a strong stigmatization of premarital sex, delayed marriage was one of the eective ways for
couples to reduce childbearing in preindustrial periods (see De Moor and van Zanden, 2009).
3.4 Population structure
The total number of adults in period t + 1, which we denote Nt+1, must be equal to the total number
of ospring at the end of period t: Nt+1 =
P
i=u;s ni;t+1Ni;t. Using equations (2) to (4), (7), (11) and
(15), this law of motion of population can be rewritten as follows:
Nt+1 =
X
i=u;s
ni;t+1Ni;t;
= [u(1  ft+1) + sft+1]
X
i=u;s
Ei;tNi;t;
=

1   +  [
u(1  ft+1) + sft+1]Yt:
(16)
Analogously, we can express the number of unskilled adults in period t+ 1 (Nu;t+1) and the number of
skilled adults in period t+ 1 (Ns;t+1) as follows.
Nu;t+1 =

1   +  
u(1  ft+1)Yt; (17)
Ns;t+1 =

1   +  
sft+1Yt: (18)
3.5 The equilibrium skill premium
In the following analysis, to avoid unnecessary lexicographic explanations, we focus our analysis on the
case where the equilibrium wage of skilled workers in the commercial sector is strictly higher than the
equilibrium wage of unskilled workers in the agricultural sector (i.e., the case in which ws;t > wu;t), and
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all skilled adults can work as skilled workers in the commercial sector. Therefore, in equilibrium the
following labor-market-clearing conditions hold:
Lu;t = Nu;t; (19)
Ls;t = Ns;t: (20)
As we will briey discuss, the above equilibrium conditions hold when the productivity of the urban
commercial sector 
C (or the cost of raising skilled ospring
1
s ) is suciently high to satisfy the following
inequality:

C > (
s
u
)
1 
1 
A, C > ( 
s
u
)
1 
1 
 (C A)A: (21)
The second inequality in (21) can be veried by substituting (5) into the rst inequality in (21). We
assume that above parameters' conditions hold in the following analysis.
Under the assumptions in (21), by substituting equations (5) and (17) to (20) into (2) and (3) and
rearranging the result, we can express the equilibrium skill premium in period t or the wage dierentials
between the commercial sector and the agricultural sector in period t, which we denote by !t, as a
function of 
. That is, !t = !(
), which is implicitly dened by the following equation:
(!t; 
)  !t   C
A

(C A)(
u
 s
)1  [
1  f(!t)
f(!t)
]1  = 0: (22)
This paper addresses how sectoral dierences in productivity improvement aect equilibrium outcomes.
To investigate this issue, the parameter 
 is highlighted explicitly. As depicted in Figure 2, under the
assumptions in (21), !t is determined uniquely in the region where the relations !t > 1 and ws;t > wu;t
hold. Furthermore, from (12) and (22) we can conrm that !(
) satises the following properties:
@!(
)
@

=
!t


(1  )(C   A)
1   + 1  
8><>:
> 0, if C > A;
= 0, if C = A;
< 0, if C < A:
As depicted in Figure 2 (i.e., 

0
> 
), when C > A, the higher overall level of technology 
 generates
commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement, which leads to a higher skill premium. Similarly,
when C < A, the higher overall level of technology 
 generates agricultural-sector-biased productivity
improvement, which leads to a lower skill premium. However, when C = A, the higher overall level
of technology 
 generates sector-neutral productivity improvement, which has no eect on the skill
premium.
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Furthermore, by substituting !(
) into (12), we can express the expenditure share for skilled ospring
ft as a function of 
.
ft =
[!(
)]
1
1  ( 
s
u )

1 
1 + [!(
)]
1
1  ( 
s
u )

1 
 f(
): (23)
From (23), we can conrm that f(
) satises the following properties:
@f(
)
@

=
ft(1  ft)


C   A
1   + 1  
8><>:
> 0, if C > A;
= 0, if C = A;
< 0, if C < A:
When C > A, the higher overall level of technology 
 generates commercial-sector-biased productivity
improvement, which leads to a higher expenditure share for skilled ospring. Similarly, when C < A,
the higher overall level of technology 
 generates agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement,
which leads to a lower expenditure share for skilled ospring. However, when C = A, the higher
overall level of technology 
 generates sector-neutral productivity improvement, which has no eect on
the expenditure share of skilled ospring.
In summation, these results indicate that a larger productivity improvement in the commercial sector
relative to the improvement in the agricultural sector leads to higher skill premiums, a higher share
of skilled ospring, and lower total numbers of children per household. However, the proportional
productivity improvement in both the commercial sector and the agricultural sector has no direct eect
on skill premiums, the share of skilled ospring, and the total numbers of children per household.
4 The evolution of the economy
4.1 Population dynamics
By substituting equations (5), (17) to (20) and (23) into (16), we obtain that the time path of the adult
population is governed by the following rst-order dierence equation:
Nt+1 = (
)ytNt;
= (
) (
)Nt  (Nt; 
);
(24)
where
yt  Yt
Nt
=  (
)N 1t ;
(
)  
1   +  [
u(1  f(
)) + sf(
)];
 (
)  C
Cf(
) + A
A(1  f(
)) :
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Here, yt denotes the average per capita income in period t, which positively aects the population growth
rate. The term (
) captures how fertility decisions of generation t change in response to changes in 

in period t + 1, and  (
) captures how the average per capita income in period t, which we denote yt,
changes in response to a change in 
 in period t with fully taking into accounts of the eect of 
 on the
labor allocations in period t.
Then, (
) satises the following properties:
@(
)
@

=

1   +  (
s   u)| {z }
( )
@f(
)
@

8><>:
< 0, if C > A;
= 0, if C = A;
> 0, if C < A:
When C > A, the sign of
@(
)
@
 becomes negative because the inequality
@f(
)
@
 > 0 holds. The
higher overall level of technology 
 generates commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement, which
provides negative impacts on the population growth rate by inducing the child quantity-quality transition.
Similarly, when C < A, the sign of
@(
)
@
 becomes positive because the inequality
@f(
)
@
 < 0 holds.
The higher overall level of technology 
 generates agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement,
which provides positive impacts on the population growth rate by retarding the child quantity-quality
transition.
However, when C = A, the relation
@(
)
@
 = 0 holds because the equation
@f(
)
@
 = 0 holds. The
higher overall level of technology 
 generates sector-neutral productivity improvement, which has no
impact on the population growth rate due to its neutral eects on the child quantity-quality transition.
Furthermore,  (
) satises the following properties:
@ (
)
@

=
 (
)

| {z }
(+)
fCC;t + AA;t| {z }
(+)
+
(C   A)(C;t   ft)
1   + 1   g
8><>:
> 0, if C > A & C(
)  f(
);
> 0, if C = A;
> 0, if C < A & C(
)  f(
);
where
C;t = C(
)  C

Cf(
)
C
Cf(
) + A
A(1  f(
)) ;
A;t = A(
)  A

A(1  f(
))
C
Cf(
) + A
A(1  f(
)) :
Here, C(
) and A(
) capture the production shares of the commercial sector and the agricultural
sector, respectively, and satisfy
P
i;t = 1 for i = fA;Cg.
When C = A, the sign of
@ (
)
@
 becomes positive because the term
(C A)(C;t ft)
1 +1  turns out to
be zero. It indicates that the higher overall level of technology 
 and the corresponding sector-neutral
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productivity improvement positively aect the population growth rate by temporarily increasing the
average per capita income yt.
However, when C > A or C < A, the sign of
@ (
)
@
 is not determined because the sign of
(C A)(C;t ft)
1 +1  is generally ambiguous. This ambiguity indicates that the eects of both the com-
mercial and the agricultural sectors' biased productivity improvement on the population growth rate
through changes in average per capita income yt is generally ambiguous. However, when the inequality
C(
)  f(
) holds, we can conrm that the higher overall level of technology 
 and the correspond-
ing commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement positively aects the population growth rate by
temporarily increasing the average per capita income yt. Similarly, when C(
)  f(
), the higher
overall level of technology 
 and the corresponding agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement
positively aects the population growth rate by temporarily increasing the average per capita income yt.
From (24) (as depicted in Figure 3), because @(Nt;
)@Nt > 0 and
@2(Nt;
)
@N2t
< 0, (Nt; 
) is strictly
concave in Nt and satises limNt!0 (Nt; 
) = 0 and limNt!1(Nt; 
) = 1. Hence, for a given level
of the technology parameter 
, because N0 > 0, there exists a unique, stable steady-state level of the
adult population N :
N = [(
) (
)]
1
1   N(
): (25)
Therefore, from (25) with respect to the eect of 
 on the steady-state adult population N , we obtain
the following comparative statics results.
@ N(
)
@

=
N
(1  )
| {z }
(+)
[

C

@(
)
@

+


 
@ (
)
@

];
(
> 0, if C = A;
> 0, if C < A & C(
)  f(
):
When C = A, the sign of
@ N(
)
@
 becomes positive because the following relations hold:
@(
)
@
 = 0
and @ (
)@
 > 0. As depicted in Figure 3 (i.e., 

0
> 
), this positive sign indicates that the higher overall
level of technology 
 and the corresponding sector-neutral productivity improvement leads to a higher
steady-state adult population size N by temporarily increasing the average per capita income yt.
However, when C > A, the sign of
@ N(
)
@
 is not determined because the sign of
@ (
)
@
 is generally
ambiguous, while the inequality @(
)@
 < 0 holds. This undetermined sign indicates that the eect of
the commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement on the steady-state adult population size N is
generally ambiguous. The intuition behind this result is as follows: whereas the commercial-sector-
biased productivity improvement due to the rise in 
 negatively aects the population growth rate by
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enhancing the child quantity-quality transition (i.e., @(
)@
 < 0), it may positively aect the population
growth rate by raising the average per capita income yt temporarily, in particular, when C(
)  f(
)
(i.e.@ (
)@
 > 0). Therefore, the overall eects of the commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement
on the steady-state adult population size N are generally ambiguous and depend on the parameter values.
Moreover, when C < A, the sign of
@ N(
)
@
 is not determined because the sign of
@ (
)
@
 is generally
ambiguous, while the inequality @(
)@
 > 0 holds. This undetermined sign indicates that the eect
of the agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement on the steady-state adult population size N
is generally ambiguous. The intuition behind this result is that whereas the agricultural-sector-biased
productivity improvement due to the rise in 
 positively aects the population growth rate by retarding
the child quantity-quality transition (i.e., @(
)@
 > 0), it may possibly negatively aect the population
growth rate by decreasing the average per capita income yt temporarily (i.e.,
@ (
)
@
 < 0). The range of
parameter values that satisfy @ (
)@
 < 0 is quite small because the negative values of
(C A)(C;t ft)
1 +1 
must dominate the positive value of CC;t + AA;t. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out this possibility
in the parameter regions where the relation C(
) > f(
) holds. Therefore, the overall eects of the
agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement on the steady-state adult population size N are
generally ambiguous and depend on the parameter values. However, when the inequality C(
)  f(
)
holds, we can conrm that the sign of @
N(
)
@
 is positive because the sign of
@ (
)
@
 is also positive.
Therefore, when the inequality C(
)  f(
) holds, the higher overall level of technology 
 and the
corresponding agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement leads to a higher steady-state adult
population size N .
In summation, these results indicate that the proportional productivity improvement in both the
commercial sector and the agricultural sector produces an average per capita income increase in the
short run, and this increase generates a gradual increase in the population and leads to a larger steady-
state population size. In contrast, the short-run eect of both the commercial and the agricultural
sectors' biased productivity improvement on the average per capita income yt is generally ambiguous.
However, the properties of  (
) suggest that both commercial-sector-biased and agricultural-sector-
biased productivity improvements produce an average per capita income increase in the short run under
a wide range of plausible parameter values, and this increase positively aects the steady-state population
size. However, the commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement induces the child quantity-quality
transition, which negatively aects the population growth rate over time and relieves the demographic
pressure of the economy. In contrast, agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement retards the
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child quantity-quality transition, which positively aects the population growth rate over time and
deteriorates the demographic pressure of the economy. Therefore, in the long run and ceteris paribus,
commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement is more likely to generate a moderate increase or even
a decline in the steady-state population size, whereas agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement
is more likely to generate a large increase in the steady-state population size.
4.2 The time path for the average per capita income
The evolution of the average per capita income yt is determined by the initial level of average per capita
income and the number of (surviving) children per adult. Specically, due to equations (1), (5), (17) to
(20), (23) and (24), the average per capita income in period t+ 1, or yt+1, satises
yt+1 =  (
)N
 1
t+1 ;
=  (
)((
)ytNt)
 1;
=
yt

[(
)]1 
 	(yt; 
);
(26)
which is depicted in Figure 4, as @	(yt;
)@yt > 0 and
@2	(yt;
)
@y2t
< 0, 	(yt; 
) is strictly concave and satises
limyt!0	(yt; 
) = 0 and limyt!1	(yt; 
) = 1. Hence, for a given level of the technology parameter

, because y0 > 0, there exists a unique, stable steady-state level of average per capita income y:
y =
1
(
)
 y(
): (27)
Therefore, from (27), with respect to the eect of 
 on the steady-state average per capita income
y, we obtain the following comparative statics results.
@y(
)
@

=   y

@(
)
@

8><>:
> 0, if C > A;
= 0, if C = A;
< 0, if C < A:
When C = A, the relation
@y(
)
@
 = 0 holds because the equation
@(
)
@
 = 0 holds. This equation
indicates that a higher overall level of technology 
 and a corresponding sector-neutral productivity
improvement has no eect on the steady-state average per capita income y. A sector-neutral productivity
improvement produces an average per capita income increase in the short run. However, due to (24),
this increase in average per capita income generates a gradual increase in the population. Therefore, in
the long run, the average per capita income gradually declines due to diminishing returns from labor
and reverts back to the original steady-state value.
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However, when C > A, the sign of
@y(
)
@
 becomes positive because the inequality
@(
)
@
 < 0
holds. As Figure 4 (i.e., 

0
> 
) demonstrates, this positive sign indicates that the higher overall level of
technology 
 and the corresponding commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement leads to a higher
steady-state average per capita income y. This commercial-sector-biased productivity improvement
enhances the child quantity-quality transition, which negatively aects the population growth over time;
thus, this improvement relieves the demographic pressure of the economy. Therefore, in the long run the
average per capita income becomes higher than the original steady-state value.
Moreover, when C < A, the sign of
@y(
)
@
 becomes negative because the inequality
@y(
)
@
 > 0
holds. This negative sign indicates that the higher overall level of technology 
 and the corresponding
agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement leads to a lower steady-state average per capita
income y. Because the agricultural-sector-biased productivity improvement retards the child quantity-
quality transition, which positively aects the population growth over time; thus, this improvement
deteriorates the demographic pressure of the economy. Therefore, in the long run the average per capita
income becomes lower than the original steady-state value.
By summarizing these results, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the steady-state equilibrium, the following statements hold.
1. A proportional productivity improvement in both the commercial sector and the agricultural sector
leads to a larger steady-state population size but has no eect on the steady-state average per capita
income.
2. A larger productivity improvement in the commercial sector relative to the improvement in the
agricultural sector has an ambiguous eect on the steady-state population size but has a positive
eect on the steady-state average per capita income.
3. A larger productivity improvement in the agricultural sector relative to the improvement in the
commercial sector has an ambiguous eect on the steady-state population size but has a negative
eect on the steady-state average per capita income.
Proposition 1 indicates that a larger productivity improvement in the skilled intensive commercial
sector relative to the improvement in the unskilled intensive agricultural sector increases the demand
for skilled labor with basic literacy, numeracy and knowledge of market transactions, enhances the child
quantity-quality transition, and induces the emergence of an economy characterized by a high per capita
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income, a high literacy rate and a low-pressure demographic regime.6 Hence, regional variations in the
expansion of the commercial sector help explain regional per capita income dierences in the Malthusian
World.
5 Historical evidence: the emergence of Northwestern Europe
as a leading economy in the early modern period
In this section, we combine several historical evidences with our theoretical results, which were presented
in the previous section. Although we develop a simple and tractable model to capture the general features
of a Malthusian equilibrium, our model may help to explain the historically observed facts of Northwestern
Europe in the preindustrial era. From the late Middle Ages, Northwestern Europe (Britain and the
Netherlands) was characterized by dramatic growth of the commercial sector, urbanization, high literacy
rates, and a low-pressure demographic regime, and thus, this region developed very dierently from the
rest of Europe. Our theoretical results could partly explain the relevant experiences of Northwestern
Europe in the preindustrial era. However, although we stress the importance of the interactions between
the commercial sector's development and the regional demographic transition as a factor to explain the
emergence of Northwestern Europe, it would be foolish to argue that it is the only factor. Our approach
should be seen as complementary to the other factors that have already been proposed in the existing
literature.
5.1 Growing commercialization and the rising demand for literacy
The regional variations in the expansion of the commercial sector within Europe can be most easily
captured quantitatively by the share of the population that lives in urban areas, as towns were the
centers of commerce. Table 1 provides data on the share of the population that lived in towns with at
least 10,000 inhabitants. In Europe as a whole, the trend is upwards from 1400. However, the regional
trends of urbanization show a pattern of divergence within Europe. In the late medieval period, north
Italy and the Low Countries were two main urban centers of commerce. During the sixteenth century,
due to the opening of new trade routes to Asia and the New World, there was a brief surge in Portugal
and Spain, whereas urbanization stagnated in north Italy after 1500.7 However, the most dramatic
6Our theoretical results do not contradict Ashraf and Galor's (2011) empirical ndings that technological superiority
and higher land productivity had signicant positive eects on population density but insignicant eects on the standard
of living during the time period 1-1500 CE. In our model, this prediction holds when both the commercial sector and the
agricultural sector expand proportionally.
7Note that the opening of new trade routes to Asia and the NewWorld undermined Venice?s key role at the Mediterranean
end of the Silk Road.
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growth of urbanization in the early modern period occurred in the Netherlands during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Those countries
displaced Portugal and Spain in long-distance trade and commercialized their domestic economies to an
unprecedented extent.
The extent of commercialization and the expansion of the non-agricultural sector that accompanied it
are also captured in Table 2 by the declining share of the labor force that was engaged in agriculture. The
link between commercialization and the share of the labor force in agriculture has been advocated in the
historical literature on proto-industrialization following the work of Mendels (1972), who perceived that
commercialization led to the development of industry in the countryside before the industrial revolution.
In 1500, the release of labor from agriculture had proceeded further in the Netherlands than in the rest
of Europe. The Dutch economy relied increasingly on imports of basic agricultural products and paid
for them with exports of higher value-added products (de Vries and van der Woude, 1997). After 1500,
England was the most transformed country. By 1800, the fraction of the population in agriculture had
dropped to 36 % and England was the most urbanized country in Europe. By the eve of the industrial
revolution, agriculture's share of the labor force in England and the Netherlands was substantially lower
than in the rest of Europe.
The expansion of the commercial sector increased the demand for labor with basic reading, writing,
and arithmetic skills. For several European countries, it is possible to track developments in literacy as
measured by the proportion of the population who could sign their names. Table 3 shows estimates of
literacy in 1500 and in 1800. Although literacy rose everywhere in Europe, the growth was the greatest
in Northwestern Europe. Allen (2011, p. 26) argues, \[T]he Reformation does not explain the rise,
as is often assumed, for literacy was as high in northeastern France, Belgium, and the Rhine Valley{
all Catholic areas{as in the Netherlands and England. The rise in literacy was due to the high wage,
commercial economy." Therefore, Allen (2011, p. 26) concludes, \[T]he expansion of commerce and
manufacturing increased the demand for education by making it economically valuable; at the same
time, the high wage economy provided parents with the money to pay for schooling their children." The
theoretical model presented in the previous section basically follows Allen's (2011) arguments.
5.2 Real consumption wages and per capita income
Table 4 sets out the pattern of the real consumption wages of European unskilled building laborers for
the period 1300-1850, and London in the period 1500-49 is used as the numeraire. The silver wage is
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the silver content of the money wage in the local currency. The real consumption wage is obtained by
dividing the silver wage by the silver price of basic consumption goods.
The real consumption wages rose substantially across the whole continent of Europe following the
Black Death, which struck in the middle of the fourteenth century and wiped out between a third and
a half of the population (Herlihy, 1997). Thus, this episode of European economic history is broadly
consistent with the Malthusian model, and it shows a strong negative relationship between real wages
and the population. In the rst half of the fteenth century, the real consumption wage was similar
across Europe at approximately twice its pre-Black Death level. However, from the second half of the
fteenth century, Britain and the Netherlands followed a very dierent path from the rest of Europe;
these two countries maintained their real consumption wages at the post-Black Death level, whereas the
rest of the continent faced the collapse of real wages as population growth resumed.
Table 5 presents the results of the latest research on the reconstruction of national income during
the late medieval and early modern periods in a number of countries; the results are summarized by
Broadberry et al. (2012). The per capita GDP data show that Northwestern Europe began pulling
ahead of the rest of Europe in the late sixteenth century. Thus, the national income data reinforce
the conclusion that Britain and the Netherlands followed a dierent path from the rest of Europe.
Considering that in the same period Britain and the Netherlands witnessed an increase in the level of
urbanization, as noted above, we can argue that increasing demand for skilled labor and corresponding
demographic changes may have contributed to the emergence of high per capita income in Northwestern
Europe.
5.3 Low-pressure demographic regimes
Western European families practiced a unique and peculiar form of fertility limitation in the three or four
centuries before the First World War (Hanjal, 1965, Foreman-Peck, 2011). Women did not marry when
they became fertile, but at a markedly later age. Indeed, a woman's age upon her rst marriage could
be as high as 25 or 28. Additionally, a high percentage (up to 15 percent) never married (Voigtlander
and Voth, 2009). Overall, the European marriage pattern (EMP) prevented between a quarter and half
of all possible births (Clark, 2007). Fertility control in Northwestern Europe was particularly stringent.
In Southern Europe, the EMP reduced fertility by less, and in Eastern Europe, the EMP did not exist.
Table 6 shows the average female age of rst marriage in several Western Europe countries during the
seventeenth century; this age ranges from 24 to 27, and there are marked contrasts with Southern and
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Eastern European countries with early marriage. Furthermore, Table 7 shows the relationship between
the proportion of single women and the birth rate in 1900. A negative relationship between the proportion
of single women and the birth rate still apparently holds despite alternative methods of fertility control.
The great majority of women aged 20-24 were single in Northwestern Europe, whereas most were married
in Southern and Eastern Europe. Wrigley et al. (1997) present a detailed quantitative picture of England
during the seventeenth century and conclude that England was already controlling its fertility through
late marriage; thus, England cannot be characterized as having been in a high-pressure Malthusian
equilibrium (i.e., a low-pressure demographic regime) at that time.8
What caused Western Europeans to adopt this marriage pattern is still unclear and controversial
(see Voigtlander and Voth, 2009, De Moor and van Zanden, 2010, Foreman-Peck 2011). In their recent
survey, De Moor and van Zanden (2010) argue that the EMP was rst centered in the Netherlands and
England in the fteenth century. At that time, Catholic ideology was emphasizing the importance of
individual choice in marriage rather than arranged marriages. Individual searches for a partner required
attaining at least the age of 18-20, whereas arranged marriages could be set up for younger persons.
These ideas were given force through high wages and expanding employment opportunities in the post-
Black Death period, especially in rapid commercializing Northwestern European regions, which allowed
women to refuse marriage unless the terms were favorable. De Moor and van Zanden (2010) also note
that growing commercialization motivated northern European parents to invest heavily in their children,
who consequently achieved high literacy rates. This paper argues that a higher demand for skilled labor
with basic literacy, numeracy and market capital due to growing commercialization leads to greater
investment in children, later marriages, and a lower fertility rate, which supports the persistency of the
EMP.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper constructed a simple Malthusian model to explain the per capita income dierences in the
Malthusian era by focusing on regional variations in the expansion of the commercial sector. In addition,
this paper showed that a larger productivity improvement in the skilled intensive commercial sector
relative to the improvement in the unskilled intensive agricultural sector leads to higher per capita
income in the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium by enhancing the child quantity-quality transition.
8There is considerable uncertainty about the size of the pre-plague population in England. A slow recovery was not
a universal feature of the Northwestern European experience, as the Netherlands experienced rapid population growth
(Pamuk, 2007).
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From the late Middle Ages, Northwestern Europe (Britain and the Netherlands) were characterized by
widespread commercialization, rapid urbanization, high literacy rates, and low-pressure demographic
regimes, and thus, they developed very dierently from the rest of Europe. Our results are partly
consistent with the experiences of Northwestern Europe in the preindustrial era.
Before concluding this paper, we mention several limitations of our research and briey discuss
directions for further research. First, we remark on the causes of commercial-sector expansions. In our
theoretical model, the productivity level of each sector is exogenously given and the large productivity
improvement in the commercial sector relative to the improvement in the agricultural sector leads to the
expansion of the commercial sector. In the historical context, accurate estimates of sectoral dierences in
productivity rises are generally dicult. Moreover, the abstract denition of the commercial sector in our
model makes accurate estimates of it problematic. Nevertheless, many historical evidences, narratives and
arguments are at least consistent with the fact that Northwestern Europe experienced a large productivity
rise in its commercial sector relative to the rise in its agricultural sector during preindustrial periods.
However, the factors that generated this commercial sector's productivity rise are beyond the scope of
this paper. Most historical arguments attribute the expansion of the commercial sector to the so-called
rst globalization. The newly invented full-rigged ships and the corresponding development of navigation
techniques opened new trade routes, and as a result, Northwestern Europe displaced the Iberian powers in
long-distance trade to Asia and the New World. Indeed, the English and Dutch trade with their colonies
drove their economies forward, and hence, these countries' cities and export-oriented manufacturing
grew, which led to the expansion of their commercial sectors. Therefore, following Galor and Mountford
(2006, 2008), an explicit consideration of international trade factors is a promising direction for future
research.
Second, we remark on the historical data on skill premiums. Table 8 shows the available skill premiums
measured as the ratio of the daily wage of skilled craftsmen to the daily wage of unskilled construction
workers, which are based on data collected by the International Scientic Committee on price history.
From table 8, we cannot observe any secular trends or tendency that would indicate that skill premiums
did rise monotonically in Northwestern Europe or that skill premiums in Northwestern Europe were
higher than in the rest of Europe. This result is analogous to the criticism of Clark (2005) on unied
growth theory that the skill premiums did not rise at the time of the industrial revolution, which Galor
(2005) counters with the suggestion that although the demand for human capital was increasing, this
demand was oset by an increase in the supply of human capital. In addition to Galor's (2005) suggestion,
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the measured wage premium of skilled craftsman in Table 8 may not accurately reect the concept of
our paper's skill premium because we dened skilled workers in a very abstract way (i.e., workers with
basic literacy, numeracy and market capital). At a minimum, a much wider coverage of occupations with
respect to wage data are necessary to estimate the skill premiums in a comparable way to our theoretical
results. In this sense, the empirical plausibility of our theoretical results is still an open question, and
additional empirical analysis is a promising direction for future research.
Third, this paper is restricted to a simple, analytical, solvable version of the Malthusian model and
only focuses on the eect of sectoral dierences in productivity improvement. This simplication enabled
us to understand the general features of a Malthusian equilibrium. However, because our denition of the
commercial sector is abstract and the availability of data is limited, it is dicult to calibrate and simulate
our model with actual data in a convincing way. Therefore, constructing a more elaborate numerical
version of our model that fully takes into account the interactions between commercial development and
demographic change is a promising direction for future research.
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Table 1: European urbanization rates (%)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
Northwestern Europe
Scandinavia 0.7 2.1 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.5
England (Wales) 4.0 2.5 2.3 6.0 13.2 16.4 22.1 43.0
Scotland 2.3 1.5 5.3 11.5 23.9 36.3
Ireland 0.8 2.1 1.0 5.1 5.1 7.3 14.2
Netherlands 17.1 29.5 32.5 29.6 28.6 29.1
Belgium 18.2 21.9 17.6 15.1 20.2 16.5 16.6 25.0
France 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 18.1
Southern Europe
Italy CN 18.0 12.4 16.4 14.4 13.0 13.6 14.2 13.4
Italy SI 9.4 3.3 12.7 18.6 16.1 19.4 21.0 26.4
Spain 12.1 10.2 11.4 14.5 9.6 9.1 14.7 16.4
Portugal 3.6 4.1 4.8 11.4 9.5 7.5 7.8 10.9
Central-Eastern Europe
Switzerland 3.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 8.2
Austria (Czech, Hung) 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.1 7.7
Germany 3.4 3.9 5.0 4.4 5.4 5.7 6.1 17.0
Poland 1.0 1.3 5.4 6.6 3.8 3.4 4.1 7.8
Balkans 5.2 4.6 7.7 13.3 14.0 12.3 9.8 10.6
Russia (European) 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 3.6 6.7
EUROPE 5.4 4.3 5.6 7.3 8.2 8.0 8.8 15.0
 Source: Malanima, P. (2009)
The urbanization rate is de ned as the proportion of the population living in setlements of at least 10,000.
Table 2 Share of agriculture in the labour force (%)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800
England 76% 74% 73% 69% 55% 45% 36%
Netherlands 57% 49% 42% 42% 41%
Italy 63% 61% 62% 60% 59% 59% 58%
France 71% 73% 68% 63% 61% 59%
Ploland 76% 75% 67% 63% 59% 56%
Sorce: Allen, R.C. (2000)
Table3 Adult Literacy 1500, 1800 (%)
1500 1800
Northwestern Europe
England 6% 53%
Netherlands 10% 68%
Belgium 10% 49%
France 7% 37%
Southern Europe
Italy 9% 22%
Spain 9% 20%
Central-Eastern Europe
Germany 6% 35%
Austria/Hungary 6% 21%
Poland 6% 21%
Source: Allen, R. C., (2009)  
 Table 4: Daily real consumption wages of European unskilledbuilding labourers (London 1500-49 = 100)
1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Northwestern Europe
London 57 75 107 113 100 85 80 96 110 99 98
Amsterdam 97 74 92 98 107 98 79
Antwerp 101 109 98 88 93 88 92 88 82
Paris 62 60 59 60 56 51 65
Southern Europe
Valencia 108 103 79 63 62 53 51 41
Madrid 56 51 58 42
Florence/Milan 44 87 107 77 62 53 57 51 47 35 26
Naples 73 54 69 88 50 33
Central-Eastern Europe
Gdansk 78 50 69 72 73 61 40
Warsaw 75 66 72 45 64 82
Krakow 92 73 67 74 65 67 58 63 40
Vienna 115 101 88 60 61 63 61 50 27
Leipzig 34 35 57 53 44 53
Augsburg 62 50 39 63 55 50
Source: Broadberry, S.N. and B. Gupta, (2006),  
derived from the database underlying Allen, R.C. (2001)
Table 5 GDP per capita levels (in 1990 international dollars)
1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850
Northwestern Europe
England 737 730 767 1095 1172 1164 1138 1144 1215 1649 1688 2085 3006
Holland 876 1195 1373 1454 1432 2662 2691 2105 2355 2408 1886
Belgium 929 1089 1073 1203 1264 1357 1497
France 727 841 986 1230
Southern Europe
Spain 1249 1249 1388 1145 1160 1160 1294 1219 1175 1145 1190 1249 1487
Italy 1482 1376 1601 1668 1403 1337 1244 1271 1350 1403 1244 1350
Central-Eastern Europe
Germany 1332 894 1130 1068 1162 1140 1428
Poland 462 516 566 636
Austria 707 837 993 1218
Source: Netherlands: van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2011); France, Austria, Poland: Maddison (2003),
England: Broadberry et al. (2011).
Italy: Malanima (2011); Belgium: Buyst (2009), Blomme and van der Wee (1994); Germany: P ster (2009);
Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2009)
Table 6: Age of marriage  in seventeenth century Western Europe
Average age of woman at First Marriage 
England 25
France 24.6
Belgium 25
Germany 26.4
Scandinavia 26.7
Source: Flinn (1981).
Table 7 European fertility and proportion of woman single in 1900 (%)
Birth rate Percentage women aged 20–24 single Percentage women aged 25–29 single
Northwestern Europe 
Great Britain 28.7 73 42
Netherlands 31.6 79 44
Belgium 28.9 71 41
France 21.3 58 30
Denmark 29.7 73 42
Finland 32.6 68 40
Sweden 27.0 80 52
Norway 29.7 77 48
Southern Europe 
Italy 33.0 60 30
Spain 33.9 55 26
Portugal 30.5 69 41
Central-Eastern Europe
Switzerland 28.6 78 45
Austria 35.0 66 38
Hungary 39.4 36 15
Germany 35.6 71 34
Romania 38.8 20 8
Serbia 42.4 16 2
Russia 49.3 28 9
Bulgaria 42.3 24 3
Source: Foreman-Peck, J. (2011).
Table8 Skill premium (ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage)
1500-49 1550-99 1600-49 1650-99 1700-49 1750-99 1800-49
Northwestern Europe
London 1.56 1.50 1.59 1.49 1.40 1.55 1.63
Southern England 1.68 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.52 1.51
Amsterdam 1.45 1.49 1.44 1.40 1.31 1.29 1.32
Antwerp 1.73 1.75 1.66 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.66
Paris 1.57 1.64 1.61 1.59 1.61 1.79 1.66
Southern Europe
Valencia 1.55 1.29 1.19 1.49 1.51 1.49
Madrid 1.98 2.51 2.27 2.02 2.06
Milan 1.78 1.95 1.91 1.86 2.00
Florence 1.83 1.97 2.26
Naples 2.06 1.57 1.47 1.23 1.50 1.73
Central-Eastern Europe
Gdansk 1.33 2.23 1.68 1.79 1.76 1.41 1.67
Warsaw 1.44 1.75 1.59 2.79 2.18 2.22
Krakow 2.00 1.79 1.24 1.41 1.50 1.31 2.17
Vienna 1.48 1.50 1.25 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.52
Leipzig 1.74 1.94 1.79 1.68 1.61 1.52
Augsburg 1.67 1.35 1.35 1.38 1.43 1.26
Source Broadberry, S.N. and Gupta, B. (2006)
